A Proof-of-Concept bind shell using the
Fax service and a DLL hijack based on
See our writeup at: https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/
How to use
Ualapi.dlland place in
- Start the
Faxservice, which will load the DLL and call the export
UalStartwill queue a thread pool work item that will open a handle to
RpcSs, find a
SYSTEMtoken, and then impersonate it. Afterward, it will create a socket on the local endpoint address, bind it to port
9299, and then asynchronously wait for a connection using a thread pool I/O completion port.
- Connect to the socket on port 9299 using your favorite client (such
nc(at).exe <ip> 9299) and then type
let me inand press
ENTER. If you’re writing custom code, make sure to send the string
let me in\n.
- The I/O completion packet will then wake up the thread pool callback, which will start a
Cmd.exeprocess under the
SYSTEMprivileges, binding its input and output handles to the newly created socket.
EDR / AV evasion
- Uses a service that is not commonly known and not monitored or flagged as suspicious by EDR vendors.
- Uses the Windows thread pool API to do setup, making stacks harder to read, offloading work through multiple threads, and avoiding easy “hints” that something suspicious is happening.
- The lifetime of the impersonated tokens is very small, and only the worker thread ever runs as
SYSTEM, reverting back to
NETWORK SERVICEvery quickly and after only doing one API call. This helps reduce the chance of getting caught by various scanners.
- Uses uncommon socket APIs that make the import table less suspicious and avoids EDR detections, IOCTL hooks, and LSPs.
- Creates the bind shell under the
DcomLaunchservice (which is already a
SYSTEMservice) and not under the
Faxservice, making it look a lot more natural and avoiding a very suspicious-looking process tree.
- Leverages a Windows bug that makes it look as if our socket belongs to the
Faxservice, and not to
Cmd.exe. If we kill the
Faxservice it looks like socket belongs to
This isn’t meant to be a drop-in, undetectable, malicious, weaponized shell:
- It is only a bind shell, which most firewalls will prevent. Opening firewall rules, or using a reverse bind shell, or doing communications over a common port such as
443would work better.
- Other services, notably the
Spooler, also load
Ualapi.dll. While the system behaves fine if the
Faxservice is “stuck” in the
SERVICE_START_PENDINGstate, this will cause issues in
- There’s probably bugs/memory leaks in the PoC — we tried our best to make things production quality, but we did not run things through Application Verifier or asan.
faxhell (este enlace se abre en una nueva ventana) por ionescu007 (este enlace se abre en una nueva ventana)
A Bind Shell Using the Fax Service and a DLL Hijack